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Abstract  
This paper proposes the moderating role of board equity ownership in the relationship 
between corporate governance and performance of banks in an era of post banking crisis that 
called for a bailout reform. The board attributes were selected based on the peculiar problem 
of the banking sector, and based on the board functions that captures monitoring (agency 
theory based). 
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1. Introduction 
Banking system as a subset of financial system plays a vital role in the economic growth and 
development of an economy. As financial intermediaries, banks assist in channelling funds 
from surplus economic units to deficit areas to facilitate business transactions and economic 
development generally. Since these funds are owned by third parties, prudence demands that 
such funds should be efficiently managed to sustain the confidence of depositors in the 
banking system, enhance efficiency, ensure the continued soundness of the system itself and 
thereby minimize the risk of bank failures (Oluranti, 1991). In the Nigerian financial sector, 
poor managerial performance and poor corporate governance (CG) had been identified as the 
major factors in virtually all known cases of a financial institution’s distress in the country 
which even led to consolidation reform in 2004, and yet re-emerged afterwards, and led to 
another reform in late 2009 that necessitated the bail-out of ten (10) banks which nearly 
collapsed due to high non-performing loans, poor CG, bad liquidity and risk management 
(CBN, 2010). The bail-out reform became the only rescue program which could ensure the 
continuous survival of the banking industry by injecting N620 billion. This bail-out reform 
generated a lot of panic and doubt concerning the status of the investments of these banks’ 
depositors, shareholders and other Nigerians consequently, led to a sparked interest in 
examining the potential outcome of this reform through researches.  
However, this paper aims at proposing a framework that could examine the potential 
relevance of board equity ownership (BEO) in influencing the relationship between CG and 
the performance of these bail-out banks. This study is hence is proposing a framework that 
selects the most appropriate board variables that best address the banks’ CG problems 
peculiar to Nigeria, and introducing a moderating variable (BEO) that will strengthen the 
inconsistent conflicting relationship between CG and banks performance indirectly, as 
suggested Hillman & Dalziel, (2003) and Zahra & Pearce, (1989). This framework, unique as 
it is, aims at covering only the bailed-out banks with a total of 2,811 branches in Nigeria 
using a primary source of data (questionnaire). There is paucity of studies that use BEO as 
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moderating variable that captures board control or monitoring role which addresses the 
Nigerian bail-out banks, hence the need to be introduced into these inconclusive findings.  
Due to the financial crisis that hit the globe, the mid 2000s saw a renewed academic 
interest in the field of CG and firm performance. However, most researches conducted 
globally and Nigeria in particular, are having some kind of shortcomings which results in 
usual conflicting findings like: inconsistent operationalization of board variables, limited 
scope, and convenience samples, and usual focus mainly on the direct relationships between 
board variables and firm’s performance, thus ignoring the indirect path (through roles and 
strategic initiatives (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Studies in the Nigerian 
context which adopts a moderating variable that captures board control or monitoring role are 
very rare, hence the need to be introduced into these inconclusive relations findings. Also, 
most of the studies on CG in Nigerian context are either conducted before the banks’ bail-out, 
or not in the area of bail-out reform or not covering the banking sector such as Adekoya, 
(2011); Okereke, Abu, & Anyanwu, (2011); Onakoya, Ofoegbu, & Fasanya, (2012); Uwuigbe 
& Fakile, (2012). Only few studies were found on bail-out such as “Kuye, Ogundele, & 
Otike-Obaro, (2013); Nworji, (2011); Oghojafor, Olayemi, Okonjia, & Okolie, (2010)”, 
which all have certain kind of shortcomings, small sample, addressing policy issue not the 
banks’ performance etc. Studies on CG covering both financial and non-financial 
performance are very rare in Nigeria except Ogbechie et al. (2009). The outcome of this paper 
shall be of immense importance to academics, regulators, shareholders, and other Nigerians 
as it will reveal the contribution of BEO in strengthening board of directors’ functions in 
ensuring good banks’ performance.  The paper is subdivided into 5 sections from 
introduction, literature review, BEO (moderator), Bank performance, framework, conclusion 
then reference. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Nigerian Banking Crisis/Reforms 
Historically, the banking system in Nigeria after commencement in 1892, has experienced so 
many major challenges and several episodes of the banking crisis. Several major reforms 
were introduced by the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) through the Central Bank of 
Nigeria (CBN), to sought permanent measures that would enhance the stability and efficiency 
of the banking sector. For example, reforms like Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in 
1986, financial liberalization in 1987/88 (such as the decontrolling of interest rates), then 
1991, prudential guidelines was brought to classify loaned asset quality and prevent bank 
distress and lastly consolidation reform in 2004 was implemented.  All these had an objective 
of eliminating banks’ failure/distress. To strengthen banks’ liquidity position, CBN increased 
minimum capital base required  for commercial banks operating in Nigeria four times 
between year 1990 and 2004, for instance,  in 1992 (from N20 million to N50 million), 1998 
(from N50 million to N500 million), 2002 (from N500 million to N2 billion) and 2004 (from 
N2 billion to N25 billion) respectively (Iganiga, 2010). However, these measures were 
unsuccessful in curtailing the spate of bank distress and failures in the 1990s and beyond 
(Aburime, 2008; Beck, Cull, & Jerome, 2005; Iganiga, 2010; Oluranti, 1991).  
Recently, due to a major hit by the global financial crisis, another set of banking sector rescue 
program “Bail-out” was inevitably being introduced to ensure stability and prevent distress. 
The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC) 
in July 2009, conducted a joint special examination of all 24 deposit banks in Nigeria, with 
the purpose of evaluating their health, with especial focus on Liquidity, Capital adequacy, 
Risk management and Corporate Governance practices (CG). The governor of CBN Mal. 
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Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, declared ten (10) banks of the Nigerian banking sector as being 
distressed due to “excessively high level of non-performing loans in the banks, which was 
attributable to poor corporate governance practices, bad liquidity position and risk 
management”. Consequently, a bail-out of about N620 billion was injected to rescue them, 
and then the Managing Directors (MD/CEOs) and the board of directors of 8 banks were 
immediately removed and then replaced with new ones. These CEOs were then detained, 
prosecuted by the economic and financial crimes commission (EFCC) and also tried before 
the high court for outright stealing, corruption and mismanagement of their banks (NDIC, 
2011; CBN, 2010; Sanusi, 2010).  The CBN has also appointed advisory companies like 
Deutsche Bank, Chapel Hill Denham, KPMG Professional Services and Akintola Williams 
Deloitte etc. to work with the new boards and management of these banks by exploring all 
options for securing their stability and long-term future growth. They are also expected to 
explore all possibilities for institutionalising best practice and good corporate governance at 
each of the banks, in furtherance of the CBN’s desire that the interests of all stakeholders are 
respected. This Press release by the Governor of the apex regulatory body of Nigeria’s money 
market, thus, reiterated the importance of the concept of managerial performance, corporate 
governance as well as corporate performance to researchers, regulators, investors and the 
general public. 
2.2 Corporate Governance 
Also, this study adopts agency theory in the framework as in de Villiers, Naiker, & van 
Staden, (2011); Hillman & Dalziel, (2003) which opined that boards have the functions of  
monitoring management’s activities. Agency theorist asserts that management initiates and 
implements business plans, strategies, and systems whereas directors monitor it (de Villiers et 
al., 2011; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Under this view, independent directors and directors who 
own shares will be more likely to monitor rigorously (de Villiers et al., 2011; Hillman & 
Dalziel, 2003).This study therefore, propose two out of its four board variables and 
proposition in this paper which reflect directors’ monitoring role (driven by agency 
theory).Additionally, these variables were actually selected based on their prominent 
importance in solving the practical problem of corporate governance in Nigerian banks as 
mentioned in (Sanusi & CBN, 2010) 
2.3 Board Monitoring function (Agency theory based) 
According to the agency theorists, firms are often characterized by a conflict of interest 
between firms’ management and shareholders, where managers usually exploit their control 
over firm operations to increase their short-term wealth at the expense of shareholders’ long-
term interests as opined by Fama & Jensen, (1983) and Jensen & Meckling, (1976). However, 
the presence of vigilant directors can reduce such agency costs by close monitoring of firm 
management activities, control system (Daily et al., 2003; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; 
Westphal, 1999). Directors who intensely monitor management, are more likely to demand 
explanations for management’s strategic initiatives and to criticize misguided initiatives (de 
Villiers et al., 2011; McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999). However, to the best of our knowledge, no 
study has been conducted using these selected variables together in a single framework on the 
Nigerian bail-out banks. Therefore, these board characteristics are proposed to examine their 
indirect effect on banks’ performance with the influence of a moderator (board equity 
ownership) due to the inconclusive, conflicting findings about the relationship of these 
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variables to firm performance (Baron & Kenny, 1986). Also, since boards’ ownership is 
found to be related to firm performance, then it can moderate CG to performance.  
 
3. Board Equity Ownership (Moderator) 
Practically, the implementation of CBN code of corporate governance in Nigeria, posed some 
challenges, prominent among which were: ambiguities regarding the appointment of 
independent directors and the share ownership status of these independent directors(CBN, 
2008). Thus, it has been an unresolved debate concerning the potential importance/ effect of 
board members’ equity ownership on both the board functional performance and firm 
performance. Albring et al. (2013), opined that in the USA, the Blue Ribbon Committee 
(1999), among others, suggests that director stock ownership should reduce agency problems 
and therefore the need for external monitoring. Thus, in an attempt to make a proper 
alignment of the interest of director and shareholders, many boards have implemented stock 
ownership guidelines and holding requirements for directors, leading to a substantial rise in 
the ownership of managers and directors but in Nigeria, there exist ambiguities and 
challenges regarding the directors share ownership status (CBN, 2008) 
There exist conflicting researchers views regarding this which uptil now, no clear position is 
given by the CBN. This show the real extent of the misconception on whether or not equity 
ownership by the board of Directors would influence their mandated functions. Also, the 
percentage of the shareholding is still not clearly determined. However, (de Villiers et al., 
2011) opined that Stock ownership aligns the interests of the directors with those of 
shareholders. As such, directors with more equity ownership are likely to objectively evaluate 
firm performance and control firm choices (Patton & Baker, 1987). Board members (both 
executive and non-executive) share ownership reduces manager/shareholder conflicts. To the 
extent that executive board members own part of the firm, they develop shareholder-like 
interests and are less likely to engage in behaviour that is detrimental to firms’ / shareholders 
interest. In support, Kren and Kerr, (1997) shows that boards with significant holdings are 
more likely to link CEO pay to firm performance and replace CEOs of poorly performing 
firms (Bhagat & Black, 1999).  
On the contrary view, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) reported no correlation between board’s 
ownership and firm performance, and opined that there trivial support for the divergence of 
interests between managers and shareholders. Fama and Jensen (1983) argued that 
contribution of board’s ownership is considered as a “two-edged knife” in which there is an 
optimal level of board ownership which contributes positively to a firm’s performance. 
However, the study of Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) revealed that firm performance 
first improves as ownership rises up to 5%, then falls as ownership increases up to 25% and 
then rises slightly at higher ownership. McConnell and Servaes (1990) provide further 
evidence on the relation between the distribution of equity ownership and firm value and find 
a significant curvilinear relation between them. By and large, board ownership, was viewed 
as an encouragement that will help board members supervise management in a more efficient 
way. Consistent with the positive view, (Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Chung & Pruitt, 1996; 
Mehran, 1995) supported that, board’s ownership will improve firm’s performance and are 
positively   correlated. More related to this study, (de Villiers et al., 2011; Hillman & Dalziel, 
2003; Westphal, 1999) show that director ownership influence or improves boards’ 
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monitoring of strategic decision making. (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003) argue that ownership 
incentives motivate directors to forgo short- term returns for long-term projects and 
strategies.   
The study further argues that, if these banks’ board of directors were having a substantial 
equity ownership in the banks or compensated with equity as incentives for a targeted 
performance, they would definitely have monitored and counselled those sacked 
incompetent/fraudulent banks’ managements. In the current aftermath of banking crisis, it is 
plausible that higher ownership could motivate directors to monitor and provide resources 
(advices, counsel connections etc.) to management which will in-turn lead to higher firm 
performance in the long run.  Thus, we form the following proposition:  
P.1 Banks are more likely to have better performance as the share ownership of the board of 
 directors’ increases. 
P.2 Share ownership of board of directors has a relationship with the banks’ performance 
after  the bail-out. 
 
Independent variables (IV) 
3.2 Board independence (IV) 
In Nigeria, many banks’ boards lacked independence, the bank chairman/CEO often had an 
overbearing influence on the board, resulting to  directors failing to make sound contributions 
in safeguarding the growth and development of their banks.(Sanusi & CBN, 2010). Board 
independence is still one of the provisions of the CBN code that , CBN on-site verification 
reports of some institutions revealed non-compliance with (CBN, 2008). However, prior 
evidence of agency theory based researches (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 
1976; Lefort & Urzúa, 2008; Zahra & Pearce, 1989) revealed that board members are more 
vigilant in exercising their monitoring functions when they are independent of the firm 
management and when they are often offered economic incentives to do so (Byun, Lee, & 
Park, 2013; de Villiers et al., 2011; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Sanda, Mikailu, & Garba, 
2005) . Previous researches revealed that the higher the concentration of independent 
directors on the board, the higher will be the level of effective monitoring by the board 
(Albring et al., 2013). This is because CEOs have less power over independent directors, as 
their careers are not dependent on the CEO, thus no any obligation between them. 
 Also, independent directors and other directors who own shares will be more likely to 
monitor rigorously (de Villiers et al., 2011; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Since the studies of 
(Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Dalton et al., 2003; Boyd, 1994) reveals that compensating boards 
with equity  and  their level of equity ownership moderates the relationship between the 
board’s ability to monitor/ provide resources and their actual monitoring/resources provision. 
Consistent with these findings and the above- mentioned arguments on board independence, 
and board equity ownership, this study argues that board equity ownership could influence 
the independent directors’ functional ability to monitor or provide resources to management 
which will in-turn enhance the banks’ performance. Also, further argues that a board with a 
higher concentration of independent directors is more likely to objectively direct knowledge 
and expertise toward monitoring banks’ performance after the bail-out. Thus, we form the 
following proposition:  
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P.3 Board members independence is positively related to Banks performance after the bail-
out. 
P.4 Board equity ownership moderates the relationship between Independent board members 
monitoring functions and banks’ performance after the bail-out. 
 
3.3 Audit committee quality (IV)  
This is indeed a very sensitive board attribute that provides monitoring control roles of 
boards. Albring et al. (2013) reported that the best measure of audit committee quality is 
accounting financial expertise, because the perceived lack of accounting and financial 
expertise by boards and audit committees triggered a widespread regulatory and public 
attention (Hilzenrath, 2002). A competent and effective audit committee could improve the 
credibility and reliability of the financial statements provided to users (Abernathy, Herrmann, 
Kang, & Krishnan, 2013). Frequent evaluations of CEO and firm performance by the board 
or a standing committee will result in feedback for appropriate corrective actions (Zahra & 
Pearce, 1989). They also, opined that the structure of a board also plays a vital role in 
determining directors' success in executing their control roles. This is because, an audit 
committee that has competent directors and well run, and also, the directors' accessibility to 
timely and reliable control data is highly inevitable in evaluating both management and firm 
performance and also enables them to monitor progress in achieving company goals 
especially through performance measurement (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). In this study, we 
proxy the audit committee quality as to the presence of a competent (professional accountant 
or financial expertise, i.e. practicing auditor /financial analysts). However, recent researches 
tend to focus on the competence of audit committee as against their previous focus on 
independence. This is because only board members who are financially educated 
(accountants or auditors), can be able to diagnose the true& fairness of the firm’s financial 
report even before publishing and monitors the frequent performance measurement of CEO, 
top management staff and the business units of the firm in order to ensure survival of these 
banks after the bail-out reform.  
However, previous research suggests that audit committees with financial experts as members  
are more effective at monitoring the process and quality of financial reporting especially in ; 
the effects of materiality justification and accounting precision (DeZoort, Hermanson, 
Houston, 2003); detecting material misstatements (Abbott, Parker, & Peters, 2004; 
Raghunandan, Read, & Rama, 2001), curtailing of internal control problems (Krishnan, 2005; 
Zhang et al., 2007) and restatements (Agrawal & Chadha, 2005), and increasing the 
responsiveness to events indicative of failure in the financial reporting process (Chen & 
Zhou, 2007; Krishnamurthy, Zhou, & Zhou, 2006). Abbott, Parker, & Peters (2004) reported 
that an audit committee’s supervisory role could be discounted by the external auditor if he 
observes that the audit committee does not have the necessary knowledge/experience to 
understand technical auditing and financial reporting matters (Cohen et al. 2002). 
Furthermore, a knowledgeable audit committees are better equipped to understand auditor 
judgments and discern the substance of disagreements between management and the external 
auditor (Abbott et al., 2004; DeZoort and Salterio, 2001). In support of prior studies (Albring 
et al., 2013; de Villiers et al., 2011; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003) we predict that the independent 
directors who owns equity shares in the banks, and are members of audit committee with 
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financial/audit expertise, are more likely to be effective in monitoring the quality of periodic 
financial reports presented by management and bank's performance. Thus the following 
proposition is formed: 
P5. Audit committee quality is positively related to Banks performance after the bail-out. 
P6. Board equity ownership moderates the relationship between qualitative audit committee 
 monitoring functions and banks’ performance after the bail-out. 
 
4. Banks Performance: 
Organisational performance is an important concept that relates to the way and manner in 
which financial, material and human resources available to an organization are judiciously 
used to achieve the overall corporate objective of an organisation. Various measurement 
models were previously developed to take care of either managerial or organisational or both 
performance. However, among them all this study adopts the Balance scorecard (Bsc) 
performance model which was developed by Kaplan & Norton, (1996). Balance scorecard  
model provides an excellent system for performance measurement in the commercial banking 
industry Bremser and Chung (2005).  The BSC is the major element of a strategic 
management system that enables organizations to translate strategic goals into measures of 
performance. The measures consist both financial and non-financial measures which serves 
as indicators used in monitoring strategy implementation throughout the organization and 
whether strategic goals are being achieved or not (Bremser & Chung, 2005).The framework 
comprises of four (1 financial, and 3 non-financial aspects (customer perspective, internal 
process, learning & growth). 
 

































This paper is a proposes a framework based on an ongoing research, to examine the influence 
of  equity shareholding in motivating Board of directors of banks and improving their 
functional effectiveness in monitoring the managements’ overall strategic system of control 
which will results in a better banks performance  after the reform. If this proposed framework 
is validated and the study completed, the finding will provide significant contribution to the 
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